dynamics of the revival since the late 1980s. The second part studies the ways in which Alevist organisations' strategies for institutionalization and recognition differ in the various places where they have settled, these strategies being strongly linked to the opportunities available. As a result, divergent identities are claimed in different places. The last part deals with the difficulties of transnationalising identity and recognition strategies on various scales, including the European scale.
THE SETTLEMENT OF ALEVIS IN WESTERN EUROPE: FROM INVISIBILITY TO REVIVAL

Settlement in Western Europe
When and how have Alevis settled in Western Europe? The key periods of migration from Turkey are about the same for all European countries; three main phases can be distinguished.
First, Alevi men began migrating in large numbers to West European countriesoverwhelmingly to West Germany -in the 1960s, in the context of the demand for migrant labour from Turkey, among other countries. A second phase began with the official ending of labour migration in the early 1970s. Paradoxically, this resulted in an increase in the numbers of migrants from Turkey, especially of women and children coming for family reunion. The third phase was in the years immediately before and after the 1980 military coup in Turkey and saw the greatest influx of Turks into Europe since the end of labour migration, many of them coming as asylum seekers. This politically-motivated emigration mainly involved leftists, among whom Alevis were probably overrepresented.
Since no country -neither Turkey nor any of the settlement countries -has official statistics that use 'Alevi' as a category of belonging, it is hard to know how many Alevis have migrated to Europe. Some qualitative data suggest that Alevis have had a stronger tendency than their Sunni counterparts to engage in international migration because of the repression to quickly. In Turkey, Alevis had a formalised religious life, even if it was invisible to the public because of its illegality. Why, then, was it not 'exported' to the settlement countries? The first reason is that at the time of emigration, Alevi religious practice was declining in Turkey itself.
This was partly due to the growing politicisation of Alevis on the left since the 1960s. In many villages, religious leaders, the dedes, were rejected by the younger generation as exploiters of the people, and ceremonies could no longer be held.
11 Those who emigrated as refugees because of their leftist activism would definitely not try to foster religious practice in their settlement countries. Another factor behind the decline of religious practice was migration itself. The areas where settlement took place -be they Turkish or European citieswere cut off from the village community contexts that traditionally provided the framework for Alevi religious practice. The performance of a religious ceremony was linked not so much to precise dates as to the presence of the religious leader and of the community, which was made difficult by migration. Nevertheless, it would be an exaggeration to argue that Alevi religious life disappeared completely in settlement countries. Many witnesses report that in the 1970s and 1980s, especially among migrant workers, private gatherings of relatives, fellow villagers and friends were organised, where Alevi songs were sung. Some dedes also visited their followers (talips) in Europe, and sometimes religious ceremonies were performed within restricted groups, but this was a limited phenomenon.
A second reason for the invisibility of Alevi migrants in their settlement countries is that many of them continued to practise 'dissimulation' (takiye), i.e. to hide or deny their identity in public, as they had previously done in Turkey. Dissimulation is a strategy legitimised in Shi'a Islam as a defensive response to persecution. Some parents even hid their
Alevi identity from their children in order to prevent them from suffering prejudice or 11 For this point see Massicard, Elise, "Alevism in the 1960s: social change and mobilisation" in H.Markussen (ed.), Alevis and Alevism: Transformed Identities (Istanbul: Isis, 2005), pp.109-135 (113f) .
exclusion by Sunni children. 12 Alevi immigrants were known to be Alevis only within limited circles, through their village of origin 13 or because they had mostly come to Europe via chain migration. Since nobody declared himself publicly to be Alevi, Sunni Islam was the only visible religion of migrants from Turkey. In the host societies, Turkish migrants were therefore considered to be religiously homogeneous, which was congruent with Turkey's official identity and discourse.
Finally, Alevis in Europe did not at first organise explicitly as Alevis. They did not initially claim any distinctiveness, since they basically came either to work or for political reasons, and thought they were in Europe only temporarily. As in Turkey, most Alevis who took up commitments beyond their daily life engaged in leftist political groups or labour unions. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, in Turkey as in the Turkish diaspora, large numbers of Alevis were involved in many leftist organizations, but Aleviness played no explicit role since these individuals were Marxists and atheists.
Alevi organisations increasingly became autonomous from the left during the 1970s.
The first Alevi organisation was created in Southern Germany in the 1970s. 14 Its full nameTürkiye Aleviler Birliği, Union of Alevis of Turkey -was never used in public and its acronym, TALEB, only implicitly recalled the Alevi term talip. As a consequence, only insiders were aware that this was in fact an Alevi organisation. When it was officially registered, later in the 1970s, the organisation was renamed to the more neutral Türkiye Amele Birliği (Workers Union of Turkey), so that it was outwardly a workers' organisation, although it functioned in close collaboration with the Alevi leftist party in Turkey, the Third, many migrants came to realise that their presence in Western Europe was not going to be short-lived, and they re-oriented their commitments to the place they lived in. In this context, come policies in settlement countries both fostered and gave direction to an Alevi revival.
Multiculturalism and the cultural framing of Aleviness
The Alevi revival was particularly fostered by policies of multiculturalism. In the 1980s, and even more so in the 1990s, multiculturalism gained momentum in countries such as Great Britain, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden, although this was less the case in other 17 Kaya, Ayhan, "Multicultural clientelism and Alevi resurgence in the Turkish diaspora: Berlin Alevis", New Perspectives on Turkey, vol.18 (Spring 1998), pp.23-49 (38-39 Given these circumstances, how can this shift towards a more religious interpretation be explained? In Germany, state and religion cooperate and so religion is a legal category of recognition. This is particularly the case with regard to educational issues, as religion is taught in public schools. The realm of religion is therefore especially significant for the recognition of migrant groups and so the main goal for religious groups looking for official recognition is to obtain one of the existing legal statuses. The highest status is 'public law corporation'
(Körperschaft des öffentlichen Rechts), but the conditions required for this status are quite difficult to meet: stability, sustainability, a clear organisational structure, and a certain number of members. The status of 'religious community' is more advantageous than that of a mere association: a religious community cannot be easily disbanded and enjoys the right to provide religious teaching in public schools.
However, until recently, Alevists neglected this possibility of religious recognition, since they did not know about it and did not appreciate the opportunities it offered. This was, first, because no migrant group had ever been granted any of these statuses and, second, Alevis, among whom divergent orientations and theological views coexist; indeed the AAKM is opposed by some organisations with which it could not reach an agreement to make a joint request for recognition, 39 and it is very questionable that even AAKM members hold a shared world view. The second reason for delaying acceptance of the IFB's application had been that the internal organisation of Muslim worship is not based on a church-like hierarchy, but the same is also true of Alevi worship; the role of the dedes, the traditional religious leaders, is unclear and conflicted, due both to the lack of an overall hierarchical structure among them, and to the breakdown of traditional religious institutions.
The last legal criterion for obtaining the status of religious community is conformity with the constitution -a point on which Sunni Muslims are usually thought suspect. However, 39 For an overview of the Alevi associational landscape in Berlin, see Massicard, L'autre Turquie, this is more a political issue than a purely legal one. In Germany, as in most West European countries, Islam has a very negative public image, as do Turkish migrants. Islam is often equated with reluctance to integrate, backwardness, intolerance, gender inequality, 'issues' such as the veil, and, since the late 1990s, even fundamentalism and violence. Therefore, the recognition of the IFB, an organisation that was, moreover, criticised for its supposed links with Turkish Islamist parties, was very controversial. From this perspective, the recognition of an Alevi association provided a kind of counterweight to a religion and an organisation that were perceived negatively. Indeed, the manner in which the AAKM presented itself to the German public is significant, and reflects the Alevis' strategies for self-representation. 
4.2.The religious transformation of German Aleviness
As the requirements for religious recognition in Germany are basically derived from Christian traditions, adjustment to them has resulted in important transformations and the reformatting 44 Mandel, "Turkish headscarves", pp.42-43. 45 Mandel, "Shifting centres and emergent identities", p.156. be an exaggeration to speak of a single and coherent Alevi belief system, but that is exactly what was required. In 1999, the AABF founded a 'Commission for Religious Instruction', which pursues the aim of developing a 'teachable' religion so as to meet the legal requirements. In order to succeed in the negotiations over religious instruction, this commission initiated the drawing up of a syllabus, which has broken new ground, since it is the first organised effort to write down, systematise and unify dogmas and beliefs and formalise learning within Aleviness. 49 In the syllabus, specific features differentiating
Aleviness from orthodox Islam are stressed, and Aleviness is presented as a coherent system of belief on the model of Christianity. For example, although traditionally there were no specific Alevi religious buildings in which ceremonies were conducted, 50 the syllabus presents the cemevi (cem = house) as the Alevi place of worship, like the church or the mosque.
51
Could these recent developments towards a more religious view of Aleviness be a consequence of sociological developments? The fact that the first migrant generation has now reached retirement age and may be more aware of religious needs may well be a factor. Have the pensioners marginalised the most influential generation of Alevist leaders, who are mainly secular, former leftists, often political refugees? This is unlikely. In fact, those who are leading this shift towards a more religious interpretation of Alevism are not the first generation of now elderly migrant workers, but the former leftists themselves, who have publicly tempered their former secularism, or even atheism. On the whole, this increased emphasis on religion is not so much due to a resurgence of religiosity but rather appears to be a strategic response to 49 There have been other attempts, mostly in Turkey, but they were not successful, due to the numerous differences and the lack of opportunity to formalise such efforts. See Massicard, L'autre Turquie, In ordinary villages, ceremonies usually took place in the largest room of a house. Specifically religious buildings existed only in places of pilgrimage and, since the 1990s, in the premises of Alevist organisations. Nowadays, some are also being constructed in Alevi villages. 51 AABF, Lehrplanentwurf für den alevitischen Religionsunterricht (Cologne: AABF, 2002), pp.32-33.
changed public discourses and an adjustment to prevailing institutional requirements for recognition. This new framework seems to be goal-oriented and deliberate. A significant indication for this strategic interpretation is that the AAKM is not the most religious Alevist organisation in Berlin; rather, it is the biggest and the most orientated towards German institutions and public sphere.
VARIOUS LEVELS OF ACTION AND THE DIFFICULT TRANSNATIONALISATION OF IDENTITY
STRATEGIES
This development raises the interesting question of the multiplicity of levels of action. In Germany, states (Länder) are responsible for matters related to worship and education. For this reason, the recognition of religious groups is a Land matter. Each state offers different legal opportunities for religious education, and the groups granted the status of religious community differ from one state to the other. The recognition of the AAKM occurred in the Land of Berlin. Seeking to benefit from these local dynamics, the AABF tried to extend this recognition to the national level. A few weeks after the recognition of the AAKM, the AABF made similar applications on behalf of affiliated organisations in the biggest states where Alevis are settled. These states then decided to give a joint answer to this request. They commissioned two expert reports and eventually the application was accepted 52 . The issue of recognition, initially local, has been taken to the national level both by activists and by institutions.
More generally however, this adaptation to local contexts challenges the unity of Alevism across Europe, because this 'religious turn-around' has not been on the agenda in most other European countries. In Denmark, for example, the main Alevi federation was recognised as a separate religious community (i.e. distinct from Islam) in 2007 and has thus been granted rights, e.g. to conduct official marriages, to obtain work permits for 'clergy'
brought from abroad, and to acquire Alevi spaces in cemeteries. In contrast, in republican around. This is best explained by the fact that France adheres strictly to the principle of laïcité (secularism), which implies a clear-cut separation of religion and state, and severely restricts opportunities of the recognition of religious groups. There, a framework that stresses the high value given by the Alevis to human rights is politically and strategically more relevant.
In Switzerland, the situation is different again. does not call for on religious recognition, but campaigns for its members' political rights. Europe and the links between these political spaces will now be addressed.
Organisations at the transnational level
This issue has become even more crucial since Alevi organisations in Europe have given greater consideration to becoming more oriented towards their settlement countries in recent years. They had initially been committed to 'homeland politics', i.e. their priority was to support the Alevist struggle in Turkey. This homeland orientation tended to be the rule among activists from Turkey in migration. 59 In the 1990s, the main aim of the AABF and other Alevi federations was to criticise the discriminatory policies of the Turkish state towards Alevis.
Since the late 1990s, however, along with the turn towards migrant politics and institutional integration strategies, the increased orientation of the Alevist organisations towards their settlement countries has been on the agenda. Turkey's European political agenda that led to the first coordinated, trans-European campaign across bothTurkey and the various countries of settlement. This 'joint' nature of this campaign should be qualified, however, since the petition did not explicitly define the relationship of Aleviness to Islam -the AABK at the time defending the view that Aleviness was an interpretation of Islam, whereas the Turkish organisation rejected that position.
The EU level
Thus we see that a further policy-and claims-making level must be added to these local and national developments: the EU level, although it mostly concerns the Alevi issue in Turkey.
Alevi organisations have attempted to involve EU institutions and to use Turkey's EU accession process as a lever for change in Turkey. Like most Alevis in Europe, Alevist federations favour Turkey's admission to the EU, hoping that it would facilitate the democratisation of Turkey and better rights for Alevis, and they have therefore been trying to add the Alevi issue to the list of matters requiring improvement as a condition for Turkey's accession to the EU.
In December 1999, at the Helsinki summit, Turkey was recognised as a candidate for membership of the EU. The conditions Turkey must fulfill in order to begin negotiations for membership are the Copenhagen criteria, including the protection of minorities. Since 2000, the Alevi issue has been mentioned in the regular reports of the European Commission on Turkey's progress towards accession. In November 2000, the first Regular Report referred to it in the following terms:
The official approach towards the Alevis seems to remain unchanged. Alevi complaints notably concern compulsory religious instruction in schools and school books, which would not reflect the Alevi identity, as well as the fact that financial support is only available for the building of Sunni mosques and religious foundations. These issues are highly sensitive; however, it should be possible to have an open debate on them 62 .
This statement is reiterated in almost the same words in later reports, which are critical of the absence of improvement and the lack of formal recognition of Alevis, the fact that they are not represented by the Diyanet, the fact that compulsory religious instruction in schools still fails to acknowledge the Alevi identity, and their difficulties in opening places of worship.
The European Commission has thus legitimised Alevists' demands, but what is interesting is that the Commission implicitly recognises Aleviness as a religious phenomenon within Islam.
Besides, these statements are found in the section concerning freedom of religion, itself included in the chapter on "civic and political rights", not in the chapter on "rights and protection of minorities", which deals mainly with gypsies and Kurds Aleviness has been recognised as a religious community within Islam in Germany and as a distinct religion in Denmark, and has been described as a humanist and democratic culture in other contexts, such as France. These divergent developments produce contradictions and conflicts on the transnational and even the trans-local levels. In fact, the location of organisations, the spaces in which they are active, and the goals they try to attain, may well be distinct. For example, when Alevist organisations in Western Europe lobby the European Commission, they do so mainly on the Alevi issue in Turkey. But the same organisations also work in European settlement countries for Alevi migrants, and may defend diverse claims in these various spaces. It is a fact that the AABF has been opportunistically presenting a more religious version of Aleviness when Germany is concerned than when Turkey is. What remains to be seen in the long run is whether the recognition categories prevalent in specific contexts will impact the representations Alevis themselves make of Aleviness, for example through the teaching of Aleviness at schools. From a marginalised and silenced phenomenon back in Anatolia, Aleviness has become a clear indicator of the lack of political unity across
Europe -with or without Turkey.
